Covert web-to-app tracking by Meta and Yandex
'Meta and Yandex use a covert tracking method on Android: their native apps (Facebook, Instagram, Yandex apps) listen on fixed localhost ports, and scripts on websites forward browser cookies and metadata to these apps, linking every browsing session to the user's real identity and bypassing privacy protections.[1]
Background
[edit | edit source]Meta (formerly Facebook) operates the Facebook and Instagram social networks; its Meta Pixel, a script webmasters install on websites for ad targeting and campaign measurement, was estimated by the disclosing researchers to run on 5.8 million websites.[2][3] Yandex, Russia's dominant search engine, also runs browsers, maps, and other consumer services; its Yandex Metrica web-analytics service was estimated to run on 3 million websites.[3]
Covert web-to-app tracking
[edit | edit source]Researchers publicly disclosed on 3 June 2025 that Meta and Yandex had been using a covert localhost tracking technique on Android. Native apps (Facebook, Instagram, Yandex Maps, Browser, etc.) silently listened on fixed ports, while embedded web scripts (Meta Pixel, Yandex Metrica) forwarded browser cookies and metadata to these apps, linking every site visit — even in incognito mode — to the user's real identity and bypassing normal privacy boundaries.[2][3] The research, published as "Bridges to Self: Silent Web-to-App Tracking on Mobile via Localhost" by a team spanning IMDEA Networks, Radboud University, and KU Leuven and accepted to the USENIX Security Symposium, also found that the technique opened a security loophole: malicious applications could listen on the same ports and acquire the forwarded data, even if the user had no apps of Meta or Yandex installed.[2]
- 2017 — mid-2025: Yandex operated a
localhost-tracking system in apps such as Maps, Browser, and Search, silently receiving web-session cookies and metadata from sites running Yandex.Metrica.
- September 2024 — May 2025: Meta developed an equivalent technique, using the Facebook and Instagram apps plus the Meta Pixel script to perform the same bypass on Android.[4]
- 3 June 2025: Researchers at IMDEA Networks, Radboud University, and KU Leuven publicly disclosed the findings; press reports followed.[3][4]
- 3 June 2025: Both companies halted the data transmissions, removed the
localhostcalls from their analytics scripts, and said they were cooperating with Google on a longer-term fix.[5]
Response from Meta and Yandex
[edit | edit source]Both companies stopped the data transfers and removed the localhost calls from their tracking scripts within days of the public disclosure, and each told reporters it was working with Google on a permanent fix.[5] A Meta spokesperson said: "Upon becoming aware of the concerns, we decided to pause the feature while we work with Google to resolve the issue."[5] Yandex told Ars Technica it was discontinuing the practice and described the feature as "solely intended to improve personalization within our apps."[4] Google said the companies were using browser capabilities "in unintended ways that blatantly violate our security and privacy principles," adding that it had "already implemented changes to mitigate these invasive techniques" and had opened its own investigation.[4] The researchers said Chrome's mitigation was scheduled to take effect soon after the disclosure.[3]
Consumer response
[edit | edit source]Privacy advocates and security commentators reacted with alarm and criticism, calling the covert localhost tracking a "massive privacy breach" that circumvents incognito mode, cookie clearing, and Android's sandbox to link every site visit to a real-world identity. Key complaints center on the deceptive use of a trusted OS feature, the comprehensive user profiles it enables, and the lack of prior disclosure or consent.[6][7]
References
[edit | edit source]- ↑ Vlummens, Tim; Girish, Aniketh; et al. "Local Mess". GitHub. Archived from the original on 2026-01-16. Retrieved 2026-11-11.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Vlummens, Tim; Girish, Aniketh; et al. (2025). "Bridges to Self: Silent Web-to-App Tracking on Mobile via Localhost" (PDF). GitHub. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2026-08-25. Retrieved 2026-11-11.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 "Research co-led by IMDEA Networks discovers a privacy abuse involving Meta and Yandex bridging persistent identifiers to browsing histories". IMDEA Networks. 2025-06-03. Archived from the original on 2026-08-25. Retrieved 2026-11-11.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 Goodin, Dan (2025-06-03). "Meta and Yandex are de-anonymizing Android users' web browsing identifiers". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on 2026-09-05. Retrieved 2026-11-11.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 Claburn, Thomas (2025-06-03). "Meta pauses mobile port tracking tech on Android after researchers cry foul". The Register. Archived from the original on 2026-02-08. Retrieved 2026-11-11.
- ↑ Kachalova, Ekaterina (2025-06-03). "Meta and Yandex abuse protocol functionality to secretly track users — even in private browsing mode". AdGuard. Archived from the original on 2025-11-08. Retrieved 2026-11-11.
- ↑ Saltman, Dan (2025-06-13). "Localhost Tracking: The New Privacy Battleground That Could Cost Meta Billions". Redact. Archived from the original on 2026-02-16. Retrieved 2026-11-11.